這一次，有何不同？ ——新冠肺炎疫情後經濟復蘇的形狀

導語

在最樂觀的情況下🈯️，一旦解除疫情封鎖，世界將恢復趨勢增長。但較為悲觀的預測是，短暫的復蘇之後會是長期的衰退，或者說這次疫情的暴發會對一些國家的經濟發展空間造成毀滅性的打擊🤌🏽，這些國家經濟復蘇的起點會更低。

拉至底部⛰，閱讀英文原文

V形🦏、U形🏅、W形或L形☦️？不，這些不是字謎的答案📴🍔，也不是某種難以理解的密碼學形式，而是描述當前這個被認為比19世紀末經濟危機更嚴重的全球衰退可能如何演變的符號象征。每個字母代表GDP的圖形軌跡。

GDP增速圖 /視覺中國

隨著世界經濟經歷GDP急劇下降和失業率的迅速上升，預測者一直在努力確定此次經濟衰退的規模和持續時間。國際貨幣基金組織首席經濟學家吉塔•戈皮納斯的預測報告顯示，2020年世界經濟將萎縮3％，3個月前他認為萎縮為3.3%👉🏻👰🏿。假設新冠肺炎疫情提前達到高峰🂠，且彌補性政策取得成功，凯捷体育娱乐 -（限时活动）即刻加入，享受平台优惠！年世界經濟將強勁復蘇，實現5.8%的增長。

IMF總部照片/視覺中國

這次經濟下滑之所以如此特殊🥫，是因為它是經過深思熟慮的政策行動：隨著大部分經濟活動的停止🏃🏻，政府采取降低經濟效益和社會互動的措施，以遏製新冠肺炎疫情的擴散👅。4個字母符號中向下的一筆都體現了這一點🙋🏼。然而🎾，各國政府都面臨著巨大的壓力，讓經濟增長盡快回到常態。

“V”形是最樂觀的情況🚓👩🏼‍🚀。它的下降階段很快就會反彈，類似一種蹦床效應👦🏻。“U”形意味著初始下跌後停滯期更長，但最終會恢復趨勢增長🫑💂🏽‍♂️。“W”形和“L”形更令人擔憂。前者意味著短暫的復蘇之後的進一步下滑🛳。如果發生第二輪感染，就可能會出現再次的經濟衰退👩‍🏫。在歐元主權債務危機期間，許多國家都遭受了這種雙倍（甚至三倍）衰退的折磨🚭。“L”形趨勢是最令人擔憂的🧑‍🚒，因為它意味著經濟發展不是因為疫情的封鎖而暫時出現了停滯👨🏻‍🦽‍➡️，而是被永久性地遏製了🧑‍💻。工人和投資者的“創傷疤痕”可能會加劇這種影響。隨著這些國家經濟復蘇的起點變得更低🍣，各經濟體將突然出現階梯式下降。

中國經驗

作為第一個因為疫情采取嚴格防控舉措的國家🙇‍♀️，中國可以為其他國家或地區提供一些可見的經驗▫️。可以說🫵🏿，已經過去的低谷和2003年SARS的經驗為經濟復蘇的樂觀情緒打下基礎⚀。但是，此次的新冠肺炎疫情迅速成為一種全球現象，而非只局限於東亞；並且來自全球不同地方的負面反饋可能對中國造成更大的打擊。在撰寫本文時，第一季度GDP和許多其他經濟指標已經發布（圖1）。我們目睹了“V”形和其他形符號的第一階段數據：40多年來🛖，中國經濟首次出現收縮💕♾，第一季度GDP同比下降6.8％；其中🧑🏻‍💼，湖北省同比下降了近40％。相比而言，2008—2009年金融危機時中國GDP增速下降⛹🏻，卻沒有出現像這次疫情下整個季度GDP下跌的情況。除了總體數據外👵🏿，出口降幅遠大於進口（圖2）。以社會消費品零售總額衡量的兩個重要的增長引擎⚁：固定資產投資和消費，在前兩個月大幅下滑，降幅超過15%（圖3）。

從積極的一面來看，中國經濟從3月份開始復蘇🧍🏻。特別是，基於衛星圖像顯示人類活動的指標（如汽車👩🏻‍🦽、輪船等🧸，還有工廠的停車場）表明，包括鋼鐵和汽車在內的製造業的復蘇要快於服務業🧜🏽‍♂️。這並不難理解，因為服務業需要大量人群共同參與生產和消費活動🧑‍🦽‍➡️。此外🤜，中小型企業受到的打擊尤其嚴重，與所有行業的大型企業以及生產供應部門相比👨🏻，它們的復蘇速度較慢。但是，它們總共創造了中國60%的GDP🎮，提供了80%的城市就業🫙。因此，它們顯然需要政府🛃、金融機構🛄、商業夥伴和社區的持續幫助，以求生存和恢復生產🛀。

其他國家的展望

雖然中國繼續表現出良好的經濟發展趨勢，但更艱巨的問題是，其他大國是否也可以像中國一樣迎來經濟復蘇。在1930年代的大蕭條時期🐪，經濟和社會的破壞嚴重而漫長🧔🏽，部分原因是美國政府在國內外施行了錯誤的政策🧑‍🧑‍🧒‍🧒：在國內🐆，采取了緊縮而非激勵的經濟措施；在全球範圍內，建立而非打破了貿易壁壘🪨。

1930年，美國紐約，大蕭條時期🏖🚴🏽‍♂️，一大批失業和無家可歸的人等候在市政府外面，期待獲得住宿和免費的晚餐🕺🏽。/視覺中國

現在的好消息是💼，主要經濟體的政府迅速采取了廣泛的貨幣和財政措施，用來支持企業和家庭👩🏽‍🚒。除了這些可能導致問題和風險的國內措施外🫵🏽🌹，一種沒有任何（經濟）副作用的有力刺激措施是，取消對進口商品和服務征收的關稅📨：哪怕僅僅暫時停止對貿易的限製🖖🏻，企業（尤其是中小企業）和消費者都會有所受益🤡。然而，限製性因素包括➿：

• 服務業占比高，但恢復慢🧸。在大多數經合組織國家中💇🏻‍♂️，服務業所占的比例要高得多。製造業占經濟的比重不同💃：中國和韓國為30%，德國為20％，意大利為50％🤜🏽，西班牙和美國為11％，在法國和英國不到10％⌛️。正如在上文中國經驗部分所指出的🚴🏼‍♂️🏷，這些行業比服務業更容易恢復🤹🏼‍♀️。

• 交易暫停✊👏🏼。由於封鎖，大多數提供服務的企業（小型居多）被迫暫停交易🖕🏿，許多企業將無法生存🚣。

• 旅遊業的重要性。在國家和地區一級的主要目的地🤭，預計都會出現收入大幅下降🫶🏽。

• 危機開始時公共債務的規模。危機開始時公共債務的規模將影響可能發生金融動蕩的風險，意大利是最令人擔憂的國家之一。

• 封鎖的程度👶🏽🧜🏿‍♂️。它在一些地區程度一般，還是已經影響了整個國家。

• 封鎖後行為的變化。比如航空業，辦公室工作和某些休閑活動的需求是否會恢復到疫情前的水平？如果不會，其他活動會擴大以維持總需求嗎？

• 疫情再一次爆發的可能性。由於只有很少一部分人感染了該病毒🧒🏻，疫情可能會再次暴發，需要進一步隔離🚿。

• 全球產品和供應鏈的恢復速度📊。企業、行業和經濟體之間的聯系更加緊密，因此任何關鍵組成部分的崩潰都會導致整個鏈條的崩潰🤳🏻。危機後，一些國家可能會強烈地召回“關鍵”行業，但是這種產業搬遷昂貴耗時，整體經濟效率也可能會受到影響。

• 合作的意義🩹。在經濟恢復過程中，全球產業鏈越快地恢復，總體經濟就能越快地復蘇🧘🏽‍♀️。如果企業和行業之間有廣泛的合作，這種可能性更大。

對全球經濟的判斷

此外🤱🏽，經濟能否復蘇很大程度上取決於決策者能否成功地實施刺激性政策🌁。考慮到各種因素，中國經濟復蘇的形狀很可能是“U”形，與中國進行廣泛貿易的一些東亞和東南亞經濟體也可能如此🖼，但也都存在“ W”形的風險🧑‍🎓。一些服務密集型的歐洲國家容易呈現“L”形經濟走勢，出於同樣的原因，美國也有出現“L”形走勢的風險，除非在特朗普的鼓動下反對州長的意見占據主流👎🏽💁🏿‍♀️，盡管這樣做可能會導致經濟走勢變成“W”形甚至雙“W”形。最大的不確定性是在尚未被病毒嚴重影響的大型發展中國家🐃。

如果大多數大型發達經濟體能夠差不多在夏季之前控製疫情暴發🍸，並在2020年第三季度開始恢復各項活動👩🏿‍🔧🎓，那麽到今年年底🧑🏻‍🔧，全球有可能產生“V”形經濟。然而，鑒於第二波疫情已經在一些亞洲國家出現（如新加坡），許多大型經濟體中也有可能暴發第二輪疫情。因此🏌🏿‍♀️，一個高於趨勢增長率的“W”階段可能會推遲到凯捷体育娱乐 -（限时活动）即刻加入，享受平台优惠！年上半年，甚至更晚🦪。避免“L”形復蘇符合所有人的共同利益𓀏🚻。而要做到這一點，所有經濟體之間的合作是至關重要的。G20，你聽見了嗎？

G20/2020年G20官網

What types of economic recovery are expected after the COVID-19 crisis?

Iain BEGG and Jun QIAN

V, U, W or L? No, these are not answers to a word puzzle or some obscure form of cryptography, but symbols to describe how the current global downturn, expected to be far worse than during the financial crisis of the late 2000s, might evolve. Each letter represents how the trajectory of GDP would appear on a graph.

With the world economy already experiencing a sharp fall in GDP and rapid rises in unemployment, forecasters have been struggling to work out how big it will be and how long it will last. Projections reported by Gita Gopinath, IMF chief economist, suggest the world economy will shrink by 3 percent in 2020, instead of the 3.3 percent growth forecast just three months ago. Assuming an early peak in the incidence of the virus (and that the countervailing policies are successful), it will recover strongly in 凯捷体育娱乐 -（限时活动）即刻加入，享受平台优惠！ to achieve growth of 5.8 percent.

The downturn is exceptional because it is a deliberate policy action. By putting substantial parts of the economy into hibernation, the aim is to reduce economic and social interactions so as to curb the spread of COVID-19. In each of the four symbols this is captured in the downward swing. Governments are, however, under considerable pressure to return to whatever passes for normality as quickly as possible.

"V" is the most optimistic scenario. Its downward phase will quickly be followed by a rebound: A sort of trampoline effect. A "U" shape would imply a more prolonged period of stagnation after the initial fall, but an eventual return to trend growth. "W" and "L" are more worrying. The former implies a short-lived recovery would be followed by a further downturn, as might occur if a second wave of infections occurred. During the euro sovereign debt crisis, many countries were afflicted by such double-dip (even treble) recessions. "L" is the most alarming, because it could arise if the aftermath of the lockdowns wipes out economic capacity permanently, instead of just suspending it. This effect could be exacerbated by the "scarring" of workers and investors. Economies would, at a stroke, have seen a step-change downwards, with trend growth resuming from a lower base.

China's experience

China, as the first country to enter lockdown, can provide some insights into what to expect elsewhere. It is, arguably, already past the trough and the experience of SARS in 2003 gave grounds for optimism and a "V" recovery. However, COVID-19 rapidly became a global phenomenon, rather than one largely confined to East Asia, and the negative feedback from different parts of the global economy could prove far more debilitating for China. As we write this piece, the first quarter GDP and a host of other economic indicators have been released. We have certainly witnessed the first stage of the "V" (or any of the other symbols): For the first time in more than 40 years, the Chinese economy contracted in a quarter, by 6.8 percent from the same period a year ago. Hubei Province, the epicenter of the outbreak, experienced a contraction of almost 40 percent. By contrast, China's GDP growth slowed during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, but it did not fall for the quarter as it did during the current outbreak. Going beyond the headline figures, exports dropped much more than imports. Investment in fixed assets and consumption (as measured by total retail sales of consumer goods), both important engines for growth, fell sharply (by more than 15 percent) in the first two months.

On the positive side, the Chinese economy started to recover in March. In particular, all indicators, including those based on satellite images showing the movements of people, cars, ships, etc., as well as parking lots of factories, show that manufacturing sectors, including steel and automobiles, are recovering faster than services sectors. These patterns are unsurprising, given that so many service activities require large groups of people to come together in the acts of production and consumption. In addition, SMEs (small- and medium-sized enterprises) were hit particularly hard, and have been recovering more slowly than large firms in all industries and along the product/supply chains. Collectively, they contribute 60 percent of China's GDP and 80 percent of urban employment, and clearly need continued assistance from the government, financial institutions, business partners and communities in order to survive and recover.

Outlook for other countries

Even if China continues to show favorable trends, a more daunting question is whether other major countries can emulate its recovery. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the damage to economies and societies was so acute and lengthy in part because governments adopted the wrong policies domestically and abroad: Domestically, instead of stimulus there were austerity measures; and globally, trade barriers were erected rather than broken down.

The good news today is that governments in major economies rapidly launched extensive monetary and fiscal measures to support firms and households. In addition to these domestic measures, which can lead to problems and risks down the road, a powerful stimulus that does not have any (economic) side effects would be to eliminate the tariffs imposed on imported goods and services; even a temporary pause in restrictive trade policies would help firms, especially SMEs, and consumers immediately. Nevertheless, reasons for concern include:

o   The much higher share of personal services in most OECD countries. Manufacturing accounts for nearly 30 percent of the economy in China and South Korea, 20 percent in Germany, 15 percent in Italy, 11 percent in Spain and the U.S., and under 10 percent in France and the UK. As noted in relation to China, companies in this sector can resume more easily than in services.

o   Most, often small, businesses offering personal services have been forced to suspend trading because of the lockdowns and many will not survive.

o   The importance of tourism. Major destinations, at both national and regional level, can expect a big drop in income.

o   The scale of public debts at the start of the crisis (Italy is among the most worrying) will affect the risks of subsequent financial instability.

o   The extent of the lockdown and whether it was less intense in some regions or affected the entire country.

o   Changes in behavior following the lockdowns: Will demand for aviation, office working, and certain leisure activities return to 'pre-corona' levels? If not, will other activities expand to maintain aggregate demand?

o   With very small proportions of the population having been affected by the virus, fresh outbreaks, possibly requiring further quarantining, could occur.

o   Another factor will be the speed of recovery of global product and supply chains. Since firms, industries and economies are more interconnected, a breakdown in any key component or link will lead to some degree of breakdown of the entire chain. While some countries may have a strong incentive to repatriate "critical" industries after the crisis, such relocation efforts are costly and take time to implement and overall economic efficiency may be compromised.

o   More importantly, during the recovery process the quicker the global chains can be restored – more likely if there is broad cooperation among firms and industries – the faster economies can be back on track for growth.

Evaluation to global economy

Much, will, in addition, depend on how successful policymakers are in delivering their stimulus packages. Taking all such factors into account, China is likely to be a "U," and so are some East and Southeast Asian economies which have extensive trade with China, but there is a risk of "W." Some service-intensive European countries are most at risk of an "L," and the U.S. also risks an "L" for the same reason (unless the insurrection against State Governors being fomented by Trump prevails, though that could result in a "W" or even a double "W"). The biggest question mark is over large developing countries where the virus has not (yet) had so severe an impact.

If most of the largest and developed economies can more or less contain the outbreak by the summer and start the recovery process during the third quarter of 2020, then a global "V" recovery by the end of the year is possible. However, given the patterns of the second wave of the outbreak already observed in some Asian countries (Singapore), it is also possible that a second wave of outbreaks will occur in a number of large economies, and hence we will see a "W," with the higher-than-trend growth phrase postponed until the first half of 凯捷体育娱乐 -（限时活动）即刻加入，享受平台优惠！ or later.It is in the common interests of all to avoid an "L" shaped recovery, and to do so, cooperation among all economies is vital. Is the G20 listening?

  Iain Begg – LSE

Iain Begg is a Professor at the LSE’s European Institute and co-Director of the Dahrendorf Forum.

Jun Qian – Fudan University

Jun Qian is a Professor of Finance and Executive Dean at Fanhai International School of Finance, Fudan University.

*本文經原作者授權🤷🏿‍♀️，僅代表作者個人觀點。